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Fro01 the Dean
The focus of this issue of the Loyola Lawyer is on the Law School
curriculum. The lead article provides a brief, but balanced, overview of
key historic developments in law teaching as well as an explanation of
notable techniques currently in use. While many changes in legal
education have occurred during the past ten years, there exists the
possibility of far more dramatic change in the not too distant future
because of several national studies that are currently in progress.
Speaking broadly, these studies are expected to provide a detailed
examination of the processes and products of legal education. They
promise to clarify the transition from student to lawyer. Three examples
will illustrate the work being undertaken. One project is examining the
teaching processes in law school and the effects of these processes on
students' professional expectations, their attitudes toward the profession
and the law, and the development of skill and role competencies.
Another study is examining the practicing bars' views of legal education,
including its relationship to career development. Particular attention
will be given to the role that law schools have had, and should have, in
the development of skills important to the practice of law. Finally,
another project is exan1ining the development of law teaching materials especially, the casebook - in historical context and will review the
current state of the art and conclude by making recommendations for the
direction that experiments with the production of instructional material
ought to take over the next few decades.
The impact, if any, of the information and recommendations produced
by this research and analysis remains to be seen. The important point to
note is that, for the first time in the history of American legal education,
a significant effort is being made to introspectively analyze the
contribution that law schools make in the training of lawyers. It will be
some time before this work is completed. Once published, time will be
needed to critically evaluate these studies with a view toward examining
the need for change in curriculum and methodology. It may be that the
fierce debate sparked by the introduction of the case method a century
ago will be insignificant when compared to the debates which
undoubtedly will follow the completion of these important works.
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Modern Legal Education
Curriculum Responsive to a Changing Society
The past decade has been a period of
unprecedented growth and adaptation in
the field of legal education. American
law schools have responded to the
demands of over a n1illion college
graduates annuallYi an increasing
percentage of whom are now seeking
post~graduate and professional
education. The law schools have also
felt a need for bridging the
ever-increasing gulf between
conventional academe and a rapidly
changing urban society. Add to that the
professional requirements of the
practicing legal community and it
creates a situation significantly
different than most law schools were
originally designed to serve.
Law schools in general have
responded to their changing role in a
variety of ways. Legal education has
undergone a remarkable transition to
fill the gap caused by the "legal
explosion 11 of the 1960's whose
after-shocks are still shaking the
foundations of most institutions. The
principle modus operendi adopted by
many schools to meet the challenge of
modem legal education has been a
revamping, updating, and re-directing of
curriculum, often in a haphazard
manner. Loyola Law School has
certainly not been immune to the
pressures of modern legal education, but
we have attempted to plan curricular
changes with a policy of controlled
growth.
Until the early 1960's, Loyola offered
only a basic core curriculum of son1e 30
courses. The type and number of classes
available have increased steadily, and
today we have developed more than 100
required and elective courses and have
established a growing reputation as a
leading exponent of urban law. Practical
and theoretical courses are blended to
enhance the law student's ability to
develop professional skills based upon
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sound legal reasoning. Professors
approach students in their first year of
law school using the Socratic method
-which increases logical and thorough
understanding of legal principles. In
later semesters, this basic fran1ework is
expanded through the student's choice
of a wide variety of elective options
which can focus on specialized areas of
law.
Students are required to successfully
complete 8 7 total semester units in
good standing in order to graduate from
Loyola, of which the majority - 51
units - are in required courses. These
required classes constitute a "core
curriculun1" which is designed to give
the student a solid foundation in the
major areas of the law, on which the
student may build in the later years of
law school and for the entirety of his or
her professional career. The required
curriculun1 consists of Civil Procedure,
Civil Procedure Workshop, Contracts,
Crin1inal Law, Property and Torts, all
taken during the first year;
Constitutional Law, Corporations,
Criminal Procedure and Evidence in the
second year; and Legal Ethics and a
course of a statutory nature, typically
taken during a day student's third and
final year. The evening student must
take the san1e required courses, but
they are spread over a four-year period.
The ren1aining 36 rmits of electives,
often times involving specialization in a
particular area of law; are chosen with
the assistance of a faculty advisor who
is assigned to the student at the outset
of the first year of studies.

Loyola Law School is dedicated to
giving its students a comprehensive
education so that its graduates may
function effectively as attorneys in
today's society.
Loyola has been fortunate to have a
Jesuit heritage which forms the
foundation for outstanding legal
education. Permeating the curriculum
and practical applications of theory is an
ethical standard, a system of values and
moral order. This heritage is the quality
which makes Loyola Law School special
in comparison to other law schools.
This heritage is also evident in the
fact that Loyola is one of the oldest law
schools in Southern California, and is
the direct descendant of St. Vincent's
College, the first institution of higher
education in the area. It was founded as
the St. Vincent School of Law and began
offering evening classes in September
1920. This post-World War I period
marked the end of a turbulent era in
American legal education which
brought about the acceptance and
institutionalization of a revolutionary
method of teaching law- the "case
method."
Legal education in America, in its
recognizably nwdem form, began with
Dean Christopher C. Langdell's
introduction of the "case method" to
the Harvard Law School in 1870.
Langdell pioneered the concept that the
law was a science, that this science
consisted of relatively few principles,
and that these principles could be
apprehended through reading the
judgements of appellate courts, which
contained the laboratory materials of
the law.
The "case method" transforn1ed an
historically diversified entre into the
legal profession and generated heated
controversy and extensive debate an10ng
the law fa cui ty of the era. Over the
years, the so-called "Harvard system" of
legal education went through fierce
criticism and gradual change through
partial accommodation to the views of
critics. Much of the developn1ent of
American legal education in this

century can be traced in terms of the
spread of the "case method" and its
subsequent adoption by most law
schools as the accepted mode of
teaching.
Faculty at The St. Vincent School of
Law embraced the 11 case method''
approach as a commitn1ent to the most
contemporary teaching techniques of
the period. The school also
implemented a course of instruction in
11
Legal Ethics" as early as 1920, thus
anticipating a rapidly developing trend
in legal education today. This
progressive tradition has been
continued as the hallmark of Loyola
Law School's innovative method of
teaching throughout its 58-year history.
The historical roots of legal education
extend, of course, much further back in
time. Law, as one of the three oldest
learned professions, along with
n1edicine and theology, serves as an
excellent illustration of the old adage,
"The more things change, the more
they stay the same." It is, perhaps,
curious to note that law schools today
are again stressing n1any of the practical
applications of legal training which
have been the primary source of
teaching since the time of Socrates.
For thousands of years students of the
law were, in essence, serving an
apprenticeship to a learned master of
the already con1plex body of
socio-religious dogma, codes, family,
property, and trade laws which
abounded in the ancient Mediterranean
cultures. A student learned the law
through experience, not formal
education. Babylonian, Egyptian, and
Greco-Roman law were interpreted and
transmitted through the generations not
by way of a university classroom, but
through the close personal training of a
seasoned legal practitioner who guided
the aspiring law student in the practical
and philosophical aspects of the law as
applied to their society. This was
particularly true until the time of the
Romans who made one of the first
successful efforts to construct a system
of law which was codified and binding
on the citizens of the Roman En1pire.
During the Middle Ages, the volume
of written legal documents and
precedent were compiled and codified in
the Canons of the Church. Monastic
training developed the forn1al,
theoretical legal education which

gradually evolved during the
Renaissance period into a formalized
curriculum. Classroon1 lecture and
theoretical knowledge superceded the
practical method of teaching which the
legal profession had relied upon for
centuries.
The Anglo- American tradition of
Common Law promulgated a system of
legal education which stressed lecture
and legal points of issue based upon a
strictly theoretical classroom approach.
Legal education in An1erica became
probably the only professional training
which was entirely based upon theory,
with little or no practical linlzs to the
outside world. American law schools
during the 18th through mid-20th
centuries graduated lawyers who had
never entered a courtroom. It was felt
by many in the field during this period,
and to son1e extent even today, that this
purely academic approach to legal
education was proper and necessary to
in1part a sound basis for legal analysis to
a student. After graduation, the new
attorney was traditionally hired by a
law firn1 and "learned the ropes" of
practical legal areas through n1any years
of gradual training by other members of
the firn1.

Times have changed, however, and
we have witnessed a transition in legal
education which has come nearly
full-circle in the past decade. Law
school teaching methods in general
have begun to emerge from pure
theoretical models back into the "real
world" of current social issues and
practical training for the students in
specialized areas of the law.
This has become a sensitive and vital
area of legal education today, partly
influenced by the large number of law
graduates, and the selective tendency of
law fim1s to hire and train only the top
students in each class. Also, with
pressure being exerted by various
professional organizations and
prominent members of the bench and
bar calling for more accountability on
the part of law schools to provide not
only the theoretical base of knowledge
but also to insure the practical
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competence of graduates1 law schools
are faced with an ever-increasing share
of responsibility in the training of
students and practicing men1bers of the
legal profession to help them keep pace
with rapidly changing realities.
This emerging trend in modem legal
education is evidenced at Loyola Law
School in three areas1 each of which
represents novel means of increasing
relevancy of the curriculum. These
three areas are: Trial Advocacy Courses;
Clinical Programs; and a practicum of
Continuing Legal Education.
The Trial Advocacy Courses involve a
simulation of an actual courtroom
situation1 in which the student can
practice actual trial techniques. Loyola
offers two different forms of Trial
Advocacy as a basic teaching and
learning tool for advanced students.
Civil Trial Advocacy and Criminal Trial
Advocacy are three-unit courses offered
in multiple sections1 each of which
allows a ma:ximun1 enrollment of only
25 students in order to keep the
student/faculty ratio as low as possible.
Students are assigned individual cases
for sin1ulated litigation which allows
them an opportunity to analyse all
aspects of a trial1 including pre-trial
motions1 trial briefs1 the voir dire,
settlement negotiations1 jury selection
tactics1 opening statement1 order of
proof, direct and cross exan1ination,
closing arguments, and sentencing.
Student perfom1ances in these
sessions are video-taped using a
remote-controlled video/audio recording
and playback system. This allows the
professor and fellow students an
opportunity for close scrutiny and
critique of each studenes courtroom
manner.
Professors in the Trial Advocacy
classes also have the option of using
outside guest lecturers in areas such as
commercial litigation, n1alpractice1 and
other specialized fields of law. In
addition to refining practical courtroom
skills1 the courses also raise questions of
ethical conduct by counsel. This
practical learning experience builds
upon a thorough theoretical education
in the classroom; the traditional courses
in Civil Procedure, Crin1inal Law, and
Evidence are each prerequisites to the
Trial Advocacy classes. The Trial
Advocacy Courses themselves devote
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It's a Grand Old School - Much of the history and development of legal curriculum at
Loyola Law School was centered in this structure on Grand Avenue in Los Angeles which was
occupied by the Loyola University School of Law from 1933-64.

additional time to theoretical matters
which, when combined with the
direction of the Trial Advocacy faculty
and the audiovisual critique capability1
produce a high degree of personal
improven1ent and professional
motivation in the students.
A factor which makes this course
particularly beneficial for the student,
and a feature which is indeed unique to
Loyola is that a student who has
completed the Criminal Trial Advocacy
course is eligible to participate in the
District Attorney Practicun1 offered
through the Clinical Program; this
allows for even further melding of the
theoretical and practical aspects of legal
education.
The concept of Clinical Education is
now a decade old and still rapidly
developing. Some controversy is
generated in the legal community and
amongst law school faculty about this
pragmatic approach to legal education1

but it is clearly a significant trend in
nwdem law curriculun1 which is being
evaluated and adopted on a large scale
across the United States.
Loyola Law School provides its
students not only with a theoretical
understanding of legal concepts,
principles, and precedent but
encourages them, through an extensive
clinical program1 to utilize this
knowledge.
The Loyola Law Clinics is an
in-house proprietary law firm founded
in 1969, and staffed by five full-time
attorneys who carry the title of Clinical
Professor. Several specialized
practicums have been developed at the
in-house clinics, with the principle

r
concentration devoted to law as applied
to an urban society. Students in other
clinical programs are placed with
various state and federal public law
offices, judges, and administrative
agencies.
Students enrolled in the Law School's
clinical program receive a wide variety
of exposure to the practical side of law.
Students handle assigned cases and
represent clients in judicial proceedings.
Some students also receive limited trial
experience under supervision of an
attorney as permitted by the State Bar's
Rules for the Practical Training of Law
Students.
Students are given a choice of wide
variety of clinical experiences. The
Loyola Law Clinics expose students to
the general practice of law in a
comn1unity setting. Clinics in Trial and
Appellate Advocacy enable students to
participate in civil and criminal trials
and in law reform litigation.
Administrative Agency Practicun1s give
students an opportunity to participate
in the legal work of important
govemn1ent agencies from the inside.
Judicial Clerkship practicums offer the
student the opportunity of working
closely with a judge in order to gain a
greater appreciation of the court system
from the judge's perspective. All of
these progran1s are tied to acaden1ic
components in which the legal and
social significance of the student's
experiences can be discussed and
analyzed.
Loyola Law Clinics by area of
concentration are:
A. CIVIL LAW
Civil Division, Loyola Law Clinics
Civil Litigation
Consun1er Affairs
Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles
(Alvarado)
Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles
(East Los Angeles)
Prisoners' Rights and Remedies
(Frontera)
B. TRIAL ADVOCACY
County Public Defender
District Attorney
Drug Abuse Division, Loyola Law
Clinics
Federal Public Defender
Juvenile Division, Loyola Law
Clinics
Los Angeles City Attorney
State Public Defender
U.S. Attorney

C. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY
California Department of
Corporations
Environmental Protection Practicun1
Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission
Securities Exchange Comn1ission
Small Business Adn1inistration
D. LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Civil Practice
Governmental Internships
E. JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
Court of Appeal
Los Angeles Municipal Courts
Los Angeles Superior Courts
U. S. District Court Magistrates

It is anticipated that as our urban
society changes and new needs are to be
confronted, other clinics n1ay be
established and operated for the benefit
of the community and as part of the
educational process for the student.
These innovative forn1s of curriculum
have been specifically oriented to the
law student. However, various
professional organizations and law
schools have begun to recognize the
crucial need for providing effective
Continuing Legal Education for the
practicing bar. For this reason and as a
service to its own alumni, Loyola Law
School initiated an extensive CLE
program in Fall 1975 which offers
courses of timely and growing concern
to the legal profession. New issues in
California general corporation law, real
property, lessor remedies, architects and
engineers liability, criminal statutes and
other developing legislation, have been
the topics of the Loyola CLE program to
date.
Continuing Legal Education is seen as
an area of growing concern within the
profession. The ABA, various State
Bar's, and other professional
organizations have engaged in a serious

debate on the direction and purpose of
CLE. Most call for a greater emphasis
on CLE to keep the practicing bar
informed concerning the constant, if not
overwhelming revision of federal, state,
and local statutes and regulations.
Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren E.
Burger recently focused on the need for
CLE to overcome the alleged
incon1petence of American trial
advocates. In whatever way the
continuing debate is resolved, it has
become clear that CLE will become an
integral part of many law school's
curriculum as a commitment to modern
legal education.
Loyola's CLE program is helping to
meet the needs of hundreds of attorneys
and alumni in Southern California by
offering both Spring and Fall classes. It
is planned that the Loyola CLE program
will continue to grow in the future as a
vital part of its educational mission.
What else does the future hold in
store for Loyola Law School, and how
will the school's approach to legal
education and curriculum change with
the tin1es? These are questions of vital
interest as new innovations already on
the horizon indicate the increased use
of computerized legal classroom
training, the effects of declining college
enrollment, the ever-changing role of
the bar and the judiciary, and other
significant social variations which will
alter the traditional faculty/student
relationship, perhaps as drastically as
the innovation of the "case n1ethod" a
century ago.
How well Loyola Law School faces up
to these demands on modern legal
education will determine the future
growth and development of the Law
School. Loyola has already responded by
building a core curriculum of traditional
courses supplen1ented and balanced by a
full range of courses which allow the
student to blend the theoretical with
the practical. Future adaptations will be
carefully evaluated and skillfully
implemented as the school attempts to
fom1ulate plans for the direction of
private legal education at Loyola in the
1980's and beyond.
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Alu~nni News and Notes
Alumni Banquet

A Toast to the Bar-Alumni enjoy the festivities at the second annual reception for graduates
who passed the California Bar Examination in 1977. The event was hosted by the Loyola
Law School Alumni Association on February 23 at the Los Angeles Athletic Club.

Bar Examination
Results
Results of the July 1977 State Bar
Exan1ination indicate that Loyola Law
School ranked fourth among all
California law schools in the percentage
passing rate of those taking the exam for
the first time. Test data released by the
Comn1ittee of Bar Examiners in San
Francisco show that 240 out of 283
Loyola Law School graduates taking the
test passed. This is a success rate of
84.6% 1 a slight improvement over our
score the previous year at this tin1e.
Loyola graduates scored considerably
higher than the statewide average
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passing rate of 54.6%, and were nearly
10% better than the 75.4% first-time
passing rate of the other 14 ABA
accredited law schools in California.
Still unofficial statewide rankings of
the top ten law schools show
McGeorge School of Law
91.5%
87.2%
Whittier College
Boalt Hall
85.9%
84.6%
Loyola
usc
81.9%
78.1%
UCLA
UC Davis
77.5%
77.1%
Stanford
76.0%
U of San Diego
Santa Clara
74.9%
The Committee of Bar Examiners of
the State Bar of California announced in
December that a record 7,246
candidates took the General Bar
Examination and that 3,958 passed the
first time.
A reception was held February 23 at
the Los Angeles Athletic Club for the
Loyola Law School graduates who
passed the California Bar Exan1 in 1977.
Some 125 new Loyola Lawyers enjoyed
the annual festivities hosted by the
Alun1ni Association.

The Loyola Law School Alumni
Association sponsored the Annual
Alumni/Advocates Dinner Dance on
Friday, April 14 at the Beverly Wilshire
Hotel. Over 200 Law School alumni,
friends, students, and guests attended
this gala event which for the first time
featured a combination of the
traditional Alumni Association and The
Advocates banquets.
Cocktails and dinner were served in
the Le Petit and Le Grand Trianon
rooms, followed by awards cerenwnies
honoring several distinguished members
of the Law School community.
Master of Ceremonies for the evening
was Laurence G. Preble '68, president of
the Alumni Association, the Invocation
was given by Rev. Donald P. Merrifield,
S.J., president of Loyola Marymount
University, and Frederick J. Lower, Jr.
'64, dean of Loyola Law School,
presented a profile of the Law School
today and future plans for development.
Co-Honorees for the dinner were Fritz
B. Bums, president of Fritz B. Burns and
Associates of Los Angeles, and
Theodore A. (Ted) Von der Abe '31,
chairman of Von's Grocery Company, El
Monte. Both of these men have a long
association with Loyola Marymount
University, and serve as Honorary
Co-Chairmen of the Loyola Law School
Board of Visitors.
Two faculty men1bers received special
recognition for 25 years of service to
Loyola Law School. Professors
Clemence M. (Clem) Smith '48 and
Lloyd Tevis '50 were honored for their
years of teaching a generation of law
students.
The Annual Alun1ni Association
Award was also presented at the dinner
to Michael F. Newman '78, past Student
Bar Association - Day Division
President, for service to the Law School.
Serving on the Alunmi Association
Board of Governors Special Events
Committee which coordinated the
dinner were David M. Finkle '67,
chaim1an, and Alvin N. Loskan1p '68.
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Class of 1952 Reunion

A Class Operation -Members of the Loyola Law School Class of 1952 Reunion Committee
celebrate their 25th Reunion at the Century Plaza Hotel 01;1 October 28, 1977. From left are
Richard L. Franck, Kenneth W. Gale, Thomas E. Garcin, Alan R. Woodard, chairman, Merle
H. Sandler, and J. Marshall Schulman.

The Loyola Law School Class of 1952
held their 25-Year Reunion on October
28, 1977 at the Century Plaza Hotel in
Los Angeles. Alan R. Woodard,
chairman of the Reunion Con1mittee,
announced that a class gift amounting
to $16,500 was pledged at the event to
establish an endowed class fund for the
Law School.
Assisting Woodard in the successful
quarter-century celebration attended by
29 alumni and guests were Odra L.
Chandler; Richard L. Franck, Kenneth
W Gale, Thomas E. Garcin, Merle H.
Sandler, and Marshall Schulman.
Also at the reunion were Dean and
Mrs. Frederick J. Lower, Jr. '64, Professor
and Mrs. f. Rex Dibble, Professor
Clemence M. (Clem) Smith '48, Mrs.
Sidney Morgan, forn1er Registrar at the
Law School, and her husband, John
Morgan.

Class of1942 Reunion

Summer of '42 -Members of the then Loyola University School of Law, Class of 1942,
gathered for their commencement photograph 35 years ago. Back row (from left) John W.
Olson (deceased), Frank E. Gray (deceased), C. Arthur Nisson, J. Judson Taylor, Richard A
Fitzgerald, Jack Carlow, and Warren E. Slaughter. Center row, Carl M. Gould, Robert Nibley,
Howard J. Deards, David S. Smith, Arthur B. Willis, and Mark Mullin. Front row, Edwin
Greenberg (deceased), Clement F. Von Lunenschloss, John K. Bennett, and John J. Conroy.

Law School alumni from the Class of
1942 gathered at the California Club
in Los Angeles on October 5 to celebrate their 35th Class Reunion. Arthur
B. Willis, partner in the Los Angeles law
finn of Willis, Butler, Scheifly, Leydorf
& Grant, served as chairman for the
Reunion Comn1ittee. Assisting Willis
on the Reunion Con1mittee were Carl
M. Gould and Robert Nibley, both
with the Los Angeles firm of Hill, Farrer & Burrill.
Classmates joining the organizing
committee at the affair were Jack Carlow, Deputy City Attorney, City of Los
Angelesi Mark Mullin, attorney at
lawi C. Arthur Nisson, Jr., partner in the
hrm of Millet:, Nisson & Kogler, Los
Angelesi and Clement F. Von
Lunenschloss, attorney at law.
Dean and Mrs. Frederick f. Lowe~ fr.
'64 attended the banquet along with
Professor and Mrs. f. Rex Dibble.
The Class of 1942 has pledged over
$9,000 to establish an endowed class
fund at the Law School. It is planned
that additional pledges and gifts will
increase this endowed class fund in
the future.

Together Again - The Class of '42 gathered again for their 35th Reunion recently, and attending the event were (from left) Arthur B. Willis, chairman of the Reunion Committee,
Clement F. Von Lunenschloss, Carl M. Gould, Professor J. Rex Dibble, Robert Nibley, Jack
Carlow, C. Arthur Nisson, and Mark Mullin.
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Legal Briefs
1930s

1950s

1960s

Hon. Walter S. Binns '39 is supervising
volunteer attorneys (who practice in the
Harbor area) now serving as judges potem in
the Los Angeles Municipal Court, Division
88 in San Pedro. Hon. Thomas W. LeSage '37
has been assigned to handle civil jury and
non-jury actions in the Central District
Superior Courthouse. Hon. John A. Shidler
'35 has been assigned to the Southeast
District Superior Court, Norwalk.

Jason J. Gale '50 has been installed as
second vice-president of the South Bay Bar
Association. Hon. Francis X. Marnell '50
has been assigned to handle civil jury and
non-jury actions in the Central District
Superior Courthouse. Mark P. Robinson '50
has received the An1erican Board of Trial
Advocates "Most Outstanding Trial
Attorney" award at the organization's
annual dinner. He has also addressed the San
Diego Lawyers Association on questions
relating to Evidence Code Sec. 352. Hon.
August J. Goebel '54, Los Angeles Superior
Court, was among the roster of seminar
panelists at the California Trial Lawyers
Association in San Francisco. He has been
assigned to the Southwest District
Superior Court, Torrance. Hon. Eugene
McClosky '51 has been assigned to handle
civil jury and non-jury actions in the Central
District Superior Courthouse. Hon. J.
Wesley Reed '52 has been assigned to handle
civil jury and non-jury actions in the
Central District Superior Courthouse. Hill
Sayble '57 addressed a luncheon meeting
of the Lawyers Club on "Evaluation of the
Profitable Case." Hon. Robert C. Todd '57
has been appointed to the Orange County
Superior Court by Governor Edmund G.
Brown, Jr. In addition he has been appointed
by the California Judges Association
Executive Board to fill the unexpired term of
Judge Robert E. Rickles, who was elevated
to the Orange County Superior Court. Also,
he has been appointed presiding judge of
the Orange County Harbor Municipal Court.
Daniel W. Holden '58 has been elected
Director from the North Orange County
Judicial District to the Board of Directors
of the Orange County Bar Association. He
has also been elected president of the
Orange County Bar Association. Hon. Roy L.
Norman '58, Rio Hondo Municipal Court,
has been selected as secretary-treasurer for a
new organization formed by the presiding
judges of the Municipal Courts of Los
Angeles County. The purpose of the
organization is to solve the problems that
mutually affect the individual court
districts. Tom R. Breslin '59 has been
installed as the first vice-president of the
Glendale Bar Association. Robert R.
Waestman '59 has recently been installed
as secretary-treasurer of the Long Beach Bar
Association.

Herbert G. Blitz '60 has been elected
president of the Criminal Court's Bar
Association. He also recently addressed
new adrnittees at a seminar sponsored by the
Criminal Bar Association on "Voir Dire
and Jury Selection." Hon. PeterS. Smith '60
was appointed presiding judge of the
Superior Court, Juvenile and Mental Health
Department, for a second year. Ralph W.
Miller, Jr. '61 has been promoted to Senior
Counsel in the corporate Law Department
of Dar Industries, Inc. Loren A. Sutton '61,
assistant district attorney of Santa Barbara
County, was the master of ceremonies at the
Board of Governors of Legal Secretaries,
Inc. Loren Miller, Jr. '62 has been appointed
to the Los Angeles Superior Court Bench
by Governor Edmund G. Brown. He has been
assigned to the East District Court,
Pomona. Mary F. Beaudry '62 and Joanne S.
Rocks '70 presented an estate planning
seminar at the Loyola Marymount campus
on March 8. Johnnie L. Cochran '62,
criminal defense attorney, has been named
"Criminal Trial Lawyer of the Year" for
1977 by the Criminal Courts Bar
Association. He has also been named
assistant district attorney, the third highest
post in the district attorney's office. John
P. Killeen '63 authored "The 20-Day
Preliminary Notice in Private
Construction Work" in the August 1977
issue of the L.A. Bar Journal. He authored
"Owner Liability for Construction Costs" in
the November/December 1977 California
State Bar JournaL Frederick J. Lower, Jr. '64,
Dean of Loyola Law School, has been
selected as a Fellow by the American Bar
Association and has been appointed to the
newly formed Executive Committee of the
Committee on Legal Education of the
State Bar. James Krueger '65 has been elected
president-elect of the Western Trial
Lawyers Association; is the second lawyer
in Hawaii to be inducted into the
International Society of Barristers; and has
been appointed to the Board of Barristers of
the Association of Trial Lawyers of America.
Joseph C. Battaglia '65 is the new first vice
president of the Italian-American Lawyers of
California. Patricia A. Lobello '67 has been

1940s.
Hon. Thomas C. Murphy '40 has been
assigned to the North Central District
Superior Court, Burbank and Glendale.
Hon. Burch Donahue '46 has been assigned
to the Southwest District Superior Court,
Torrance. Hon. Carroll M. Dunnurn '46 has
been assigned supervising judge for the
second year to the South District Superior
Court, Long Beach. Hon. Ernest L. Kelly
'48 has been assigned to the South District
Superior Court, Long Beach. Hon. Robert
C. Nye '48 has been assigned to handle civil
jury and non-jury action in the Central
District Superior Courthouse. He also was
presented the Alfred J. McCourtney
Memorial Award by the Los Angeles Trial
Lawyer's Association at their annual
installation dinner. Hon. Raymond R.
Roberts '48 has been assigned to the
Northwest District Superior Court, Van
Nuys. Paul Caruso '49 has been elected
president of the newly-formed
Italian-American Lawyers Association.
Justice Lynn D. Compton '49 has been
elected installing officer for the Culver
City Bar Association. Hon. Otto M. Kaus ·•49
was the guest speaker at a seminar
sponsored by the Planning and Training
Division of the·Los Angeles County
District Attorney's Office. Hon. L. Harold
Chaille '49 has been elected presiding
judge of the Imperial Municipal Court
system.
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elected treasurer of the Italian-American
Lawyers of California. Lynne D. Finney '67
is the fii:st woman to be appointed Director
of the Office of Industry Development of
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, a
regulatory agency for the savings and loan
industry. W.C. Fields, III '68, the comedian's
grandson, is the proud father of W.C.
Fields, rv; who made his debut in September
1977 at seven pounds and fourteen ounces.
Wayne K. Lemieux '68 authored "Land Use
Control by Utility Service Moratorium:
The Wrong Solution to the Right Problem" in
the November 1977 L.A. Bar Journal.
Laurence G. Preble '68 was master of
ceremonies at the Loyola Law School
Alumni luncheon of the State Bar
Convention. Benjamin Aranda III '69 has
been elected president of the National La
Raza Bar Association. He has also been
elected Trustee of the L.A. County Bar
Association. Kenneth Lee Chotiner '69
spoke on "Handling the Defense of the
Occasional Misdemeanor Case" to the
Santa Monica Bay District Bar Association.
Stephen D. Cunnison '69 has been
installed as secretary of the Riverside County
Bar Association.

1970's
John L. Guth '70 has opened his office for
general practice in Yuba City. Joanne S.
Rocks '70 and Mary F. Beaudry '62
presented an estate planning seminar at the
Loyola Marymount campus on March 8.
Gary M. Ruttenberg '70 has announced the
formation of the law offices Ruttenberg
and Tanzman in Los Angeles. Cynthia M.
Ryan '70 has been appointed to the
position of vice-president and general
counsel of California Life Insurance
Company, a subsidiary of California Life
Corporation. Stephen C. Taylor '70 has
been elected treasurer of the San Fernando
Valley Bar Association. Kathryn. Doi Todd
'70 has been appointed assistant prosecutor
in the district attorney's office. Gordon S.
Benson '71 has announced the opening of his
corporate law, securities regulations and
civil litigation offices in Encino. John F.
Sawyer '71 has been named new director
of the Orange County Bm: Association's
Lawyer Referral Service. Herbert F. Blanck
'71 has been installed as first vice-president
of Phi Alpha Delta, Los Angeles Alumni
Chapter. Richard Douglas Brew '71 is
engaged in International Business Law and
Finance, the first to be based in London,
England. Gary F. Overstreet '71 has been
installed as marshall of the Phi Alpha Delta,

Los Angeles Alunmi Chapter. Rosemary
Garcia '72 has been nominated to the
National Science Foundation's Committee
on Science Education. Michael C. Mitchell
'72 authored "Not Separate But Equal:
Community Property and the 'Reformed'
Marital Deduction" in October 1977 L.A.
Bar Journal. Susanne C. Wylie '72 was one of
the co-editors of the sympositun issue of
the Los Angeles Bar Journal, September,
1977. Mark P. Robinson, JL '72
Thomas F. Coleman '73 was the main
speaker at the January meeting of the Gay
Law Students Union of Los Angeles. DL
Selwyn Rose '73 addressed the California
Attomies for Criminal Justice on ''A
Psychiatrist Looks Back at the Attorney
and the Judge Looks at Both." Carol E. Schatz
'73 has been installed as the corresponding
secretary for the Women's Lawyers
Association of Los Angeles. David E. Tripp
'73 was the first place winner in the Third
Annual West Publishing Company
Lawyers Art Contest. Mr. Tripp was the
winner of the first contest held in 1975.
Richard W. Wright '73 has been appointed
assistant professor at Yeshiva University's
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, New
York. Keith G. Burt '74 has been elected
treasurer of the Black Attorneys of San Diego
County. Teresa P. Cark '74 has announced
her association with Shepphird & DeGraw in
Huntington Beach. Timothy D. Takata '74
has authored his first novel, The Last Exam,
a story of the making of a lawyer. Stephen
A. McKee '74 has been appointed by City
Attorney Burt Pines, assistant supervisor
of the Van Nuys criminal branch. Ronald K.
L. Collins '75 chaired a two-day
constitutional law conference at
Southwestern Law School. He is presently
collecting essays for a forthcoming book.
Carol S. Frederick '75 is the co-editor of
the California Women Lawyers' Bulletin; and
convention chairperson for the Women
Lawyers Association of Los Angeles. Joanne
Bockian '75 recently opened the firm
Bockian & Hanifan. She was erroneously
identified as James Bockian in the Winter
1977 issue of the Loyola Lawyer. Our
apologies to Ms. Bockian. Mark W.

Gibbons '75 has announced his partnership
in the fim1 of Billbray, Gibbons & Pitaro in
Las Vegas, Nevada. Jeffrey G. Sheldon '75 has
been elected secretary-treasurer of the
Pasadena Young Lawyers. Jess J. Araujo '76
has been elected vice-president of the
Mexican- American Bm: Association. He is
also searching for heirs in a $400,000 land
dispute in Texas. Kathryn A. Ballsun '76
authored the article "Laing vs. United
States: A Hollow Victory for the Jeopardy Tax
Payer" in the July/August 1977 Beverly
Hills Bar Association Journal. Patrick L.
Garofalo '76 has opened law offices in
Beverly Hills. James R. Gotcher '76 has
announced his association with David L.
Shapiro, forming the fim1 Gotcher & Shapiro.
The firm will emphasize immigration law
and international business. Donald Peckner
'76 has edited, in conjunction with I. M.
Bernstein, Handbook of Stainless Steels.
Donald is the associate editor for
Encyclopedia of Engineering Materials eiJ
Processes. Christopher Real '76 has
announced his association with the firm of
Morgan, Wenzel & McNichols in Los
Angeles. Laurie J. Bernhard '77 has won
second prize in the 1977 Nathan Burkan
Memorial Competition. Her winning essay
was entitled, "Infringements & Damages
in Violations of Copyright Monopolies:
Protection for the Musical Artist." Peter L.
Clinco '77 has been appointed as assistant
to the chairman of the Board of the
investment banking firm of Cantor,
Fitzgerald & Company.

In Memoriam
Condolences are extended for Robert D.
Lynch '72 who was fatally injured by an
intruder in his Pasadena home on February
13, 1978. Mr. Lynch is survived by his
widow, Heidi, two small children, and his
brother, Patrick S. Lynch, a member of the
Loyola Law School adjunct faculty. Mr. Lynch
had been named as a partner in the firm of
Agnew, Miller &_ Carlson, Los Angeles,
effective January 1, 1978. Funeral services
were held at St. Bede's Catholic Church on
February 16, burial was at Holy Cross
Cemetery.
At the request of his partners, classmates
and friends a memorial fund will be
established. Additional information regarding
this fund will be forthcoming.
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Alumni Chapters
Formation

Orange Grooves-Everybody had a good time at the banquet sponsored by the Orange
County Alumni Chapter. The annual event honored six Loyola Law School alumni who are
currently serving on the bench in Orange County. Dean Frederick J. Lower, Jr. '64 presented
an informative overview on the current state of the Law School and future trends in legal
education.

Orange County
Alumni Event at
Country Club
The Loyola Law School Orange County
Alumni Chapter held their annual
social event January 31, 1978 at the Big
Canyon Country Club in Newport
Beach. Forty-two alun1ni, along with
spouses and friends, attended the event.
Chairperson of the Orange County
Alunmi Chapter,; Mrs. Sheila P.
Sonenshine 70, served as n1aster of
ceremonies for the proceedings which
honored six Loyola Law School alun1ni
for their service on the Bench in Orange
County.
Recognition was extended to the Han.
Robert L. Corfn1an '39, retired Superior
Court Judge; Han. Luis A. Cardenas '68,
Municipal Court of the North Orange
County Judicial District; Han. Samuel

RiversideSan Bernardino
Alumni Event
The Riverside/San Bernardino Alumni
Chapter held a successful first annual
alumni event at the Smugglers Inn, San
Bernardino, on January 27, 1978.
The banquet was attended by 20
Loyola Law School alunmi and their
guests.
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E. Collins '51, West Orange County
Municipal Court Commissioner; Han.
John C. Teal'61, Municipal Court of the
Central Orange County Judicial
District; Han. Jan1es K. Turner '51,
Superior Court; and Han. Robert C.
Todd '57, recently appointed Superior
Court fudge.
Loyola Law School faculty and staff
members attending the event included
Dean and Mrs. Frederick J. Lowe~ Jr.
'64, Professor George C. (Curt) Garbesi,
Lola McAlpin-Grant, assistant dean for
Student Services, and Joan Profant,
director of Placen1ent.
Working on the event's planning
committee were Charles W. Garrity '61,
Mrs. Elizabeth Y. Williams '70, Terrence
M. O'Shea '76, Joanne S. Rocks '70,
Burleigh f. Brewer '67, Marshall M.
Schulman '52, Guillermo W. Schnaider
'69, Caldwell R. Campbell '67, and
Mark E. Minyard '76.
Serving as master of ceremonies for
the evening was the Han. J. Steve
Williams '41, Superior Court Judge of
San Bernardino County.
Featured speaker for the event waS
Loyola Law School Dean Frederick J.
Lower, Jr. '64, who attended with his
wife, Virginia.
Planning the event were Philip B.
Wagner '57, president of the alumni
chapter,; and his committee which
included Gerald 0. Egan '51, James L.
Liesch '60, Justin M. McCarthy '53,
Victor G. Tessier '54, and Judge
Williams.

As reported in the Wmter 1977 issue of
the Loyola Lawyer, 18 new Alumni
Chapters have been organized within
California in order to effectively unite
Loyola Law School and its alumni in a
working relationship. The respective
chairpersons and their addresses were
listed to facilitate your contact and
involvement with the Alumni Chapters.
A chapter has now been formed
in the West San Gabriel Valley. The
chairman is fohn H. Brink '58 of Irsfeld,
Irsfeld & Younge~ 7060 Hollywood
Boulevard, Suite 1011, Los Angeles,
California 90028, (213) 466-4161.
We now have more than 4,200
men1bers of the Alumni Association.
The Alunmi Chapters have been formed
to increase communications and to
organize various social, educational,
and liaison activities within your
communities. Your interest and
participation are welcome.
Alumni are now scattered throughout
the United States; howeve:r; nearly 80
percent of your classmates reside and
practice in California. Following is a
brief demographic profile of each
chapter to acquaint you with the
number of alumni in your area.
Alumni Chapter
261
18
38
346
129
210
495
300
261
71
95
70
90
24
265
40
294
299

Beverly Hills/Brentwood/
Westwood
Central Coast
Central Valley
East San Fernando Valley
East San Gabriel Valley
Long Beach/San Pedro
Los Angeles
Orange County
Pacific Palisades/Santa Monica
Palos Verdes
Riverside/San Bernardino
San Diego
San Francisco/Sacran1ento
Santa Barbara
South Bay
Ventura/Oxnard
West San Fernando Valley
West San Gabriel Valley

Legal Education: the Progressive Tradition

Loyola Law School has established a
reputation for excellence in many
areas since our founding in 1920. We
have been fortunate to have the opportunity and commitment to build
a progressive tradition of academic
and professional expertise during
our 58-year history of service to the
legal community. All of our students, faculty, alumni, and staff
have contributed in their own way
to this fine and growing reputation,
and the results are sell-evident.
Each year Loyola Law School
graduates consistently sh ow better
results on the California Bar Exan1
than graduates of other schools. Indeed, they receive ten percent
higher passing average than oth er
ABA accredited law schools in
California. Did you ever wonder
why? What is it that makes the

Loyola Law trained attorney better
than average ... the answer is simple. It is the Loyola Law School
educational program.
This program of teaching and
learning is unique to our area. It is
one which not only provides the
compreh ensive and indepth review
of the law itself, but also emphasizes the practical aspects of the
law by offering the student exposure
to the law at work through a multifaceted law clinic program.
In today's society much of the
"law explosion" is related to the
changing complexities of our urban
centers and Loyola Law School has
been and continues to be an urban
law school, str essing the problems
of the urban centers of California,
the nation and around the world.
It is the continuation and enh ancem ent of these progran1s that
keeps Loyola Law School in the
forefront of legal education. The
flexibility to change or add to the
curriculum, the clinical program,
the constant review of urban problems with the accompanying addition and/or deletion of course mate-

rial allows Loyola to provide its
graduates with the adaptability to
cope with these ever changing and
challenging problems when entering
the legal profession.
The ability to meet these changes
and challenges with viable educational programs now and in the future will continue only with the
support of the Loyola Law School
alumni and friends . . . your unrestricted gift now to Loyola Law
School will provide the support
needed to continu e and enhance th e
educational programs which make
Loyola Law School an important
force in legal education.

A Guide to Tax
Deduction and
Charitable Gift
Citations
Citations of Authority
The Federal government encourages gifts to
schools, churches, hospitals, and other public
supported charities such as Loyola Law
School by allowing charitable deductions for
a variety of gifts to non-profit institutions.
Below is a listing of relevant court citations,
Internal Revenue codes, Treasury regulations, and revenue rulings directly relating to
the various forms of charitable giving.
We hope it will serve as a ready reference
guide for your personal and professional consideration.
Cash - Deductible up to SO% of donor's adjusted gross income. IRC §170(b)(1)!A); Reg.
§l.l70A-8. S-year carryover allowed for any
"excess." IRC §170(d)(1), Reg. §1.170A-10(a).
Securities and real estate held long-term {1
year or longer) -Deductible at the full present fair market value, with no capital gain on
the appreciation. IRC §170(e). Deductible up
to 30% of adjusted gross income. IRC
§170(b)(1)(D)(i); Reg. §1.170A-8(d)(1). Five-year
carryover allowed for any "excess." IRC
§170(b)(I)!D)(ii).

Under election, donor can increase ceiling to
SO% of adjusted gross income (with a S-year
carryover for any "excess") by making the
same gift, but (I) reducing the amount of the
deduction for all long-term property gifts during the year by one-half of the appreciation,
and (2) similarly reducing the deduction for
long-term property gifts being carried over
from either years. IRC §170(b)!l)(D)(iii); Reg.
§l.l70A-8(d)(2).
Held short-term (less than 1 year) - Deduction is for cost-basis. IRC §170(e)!1)(A). Deductible up to SO% of adjusted gross income.
IRC §170(b)(l)(A). Five-year carryover allowed
for any "excess." IRC §I70(d)!1); Reg.
§1.170A-4.
Tangible personal property (e.g., works of art,
antiques, books) held long-term Reg.
§1.170A-4 -Related Gifts: Deduction is full
present fair market value, with no capital
gain on appreciation, if use of the property is
related to donee's exempt function (e.g., gift
of painting to art museum or to school for its
art gallery). IRC §170(e)!l)!B)(i). Deductible up
to 30% of adjusted gross income. IRC
§170(b)(l)(D)!i). Five-year carryover allowed
for any "excess." IRC §170(d)!1). Deductible
up to SO% of adjusted gross income (wi th
five-year carryover for any "excess") if same
election made as for gift of long-term securities or real estate, abovt;.

Held short-term - Same as gifts of shortterm securities and real estate, above.

Umelated Gifts: If the gift is wuelated to
donee's exempt function, deduction is fair
market value minus one-half of the appreciation. IRC §170(e)(1)!B)!i). Deductible u p to
SO% of adjusted gross income. IRC
§170(b)!l)!A). Five-year carryover allowed for
any "excess." IRC §170(d)!1).
Bargain sales - Charitable deduction.
Allowed for difference between fair market
value and sales price for bargain sales for
long-term securities and real estate. IRC
§170(e)(2); Magnolia Dev. Corp., 19 TCM 934;
Waller, 39 TC 665 (Acq.); Gladstein, (DC)68-1
USTC 119197; Gamble (DC) 68-1 USTC
119393.

Capital gain implications. Cost-basis of
property must be allocated between portion
of property "sold" and portion of property
"given" to charity on basis of fair market
value of each. Appreciation allocable to sale
is subject to capital gains taxation; appreciation allocable to gift is not IRC §1011(b).
Caveat: Outright gift of mortgaged property
is considered a bargain sale. Reg. §l.l0ll2(a)(3).
Treasury requirements Substantiating
charitable deductions. See Reg. § l.l70A1(a)(2).
Deduction Dates

A gift is deemed delivered for determining
valuation and year of deduction. Reg.
§l.l70A-J(b).
Securities - If mailed, date of mailing is delivery date; if hand delivered to charity, date
received by charity is delivery date. If securities delivered to donor's bank or broker
(as donor 's agent) or to the issuing corporation (or its agent) instructing corporation to
reissue in charity's nan1e, delivery date is
date securities transferred to charity's name
on corporation's books (date on new stock
certificate having charity's name).
Check - U mailed, date of mailing is delivery date; if hand delivered to charity, date received by charity is delivery date.
Art works and other tangible personal property - Date property received by charity is
delivery date.
Real Estate -Date charity receives property
executed deed is delivery date.
Pledges - Deductible in year fulfilled- not
when made. IRC §170(a)( l). Satisfying pledge
with property does not give rise to taxable
gain or deductible loss. Rev. Rul. S5-410,
19SS-1 Cll 297.
Determining fair market value - Gifts of
securities - When there is market for
securities on a stock exchange or over the
counter: Fair market value is mean between
highest and lowest quoted selling prices on
date of delivery. Reg. §20.2031-2.
Mutual fund shares (open-end investment
companies). Fair market value is redemption
price ("bid"). Cartwright, U.S. Sup. Ct., 411
U.S. S46 (1973).
Closed-end investment company shares:
Valued the same way as securities traded on a
stock exchange or over-the-counter. Reg.
§20.2031-2.

Real estate, worl<s of art and other property
not traded on an exchange or over the
counter - Fair market value is price at
which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller,
neither being under any compulsion to buy
or sell and both having reasonable knowledge
of relevant facts. Reg. §1.170A-1(c). Deterruined by expert appraisals. Cost of appraisal
deductible as TRC §212(3) deduction; thus
percent of adjusted gross income ceiling inapplicable. Rev. Rul. 67-461, 1967-2 CB 12S.
For guidelines to be used in making appraisals, sec: Rev. Proc. 66-49, 1966-2 CB 1257.
Services- No charitable deduction for value
of personal services rendered free for charity.
Reg. §1.170A-1(g); Rev. Rul. 19S3-162, 1953-2
CB 127; Rev. Rul. 67-236, 1967-2 CB 103.
Unreimbursed voltmteer expenses - Deductible when incurred in rendering services for
charity. Rev. Rul. SS-4, 19SS-1 CB 291. Optional standard mileage rate of 7¢ a mile for
unreirnbursed automobile expenses. Rev.
Proc. 74-24, 1974-2 CB 477 . Ceiling is 20% of
adjusted gross income, with no five-year carryover. IRC §170(b)(1)(B); IRC §170(d)(1)(A);
Reg. §1.170A-l(g). Unreimbursed babysitting
expenses incurred to render volun teer services not deductible. Rev. Rul. 73-S97, 1973-2
CB 69.
Patron's gifts - Contribution is an10unt
transferred by donor less value of theatre
ticket, meal or other privi lege donor receives.
Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 CB 104.
Installment obligation -caveat - Gift of
installment obligation (taxpayer elected on
sale to pay gains tax in installments under
IRC §4S3) accelerates remaining deferred
gain in year of gift. Rev. Rul. SS-1S7, 195S-1
CB 293.
Depreciable personal property - Contribution deduction reduced by what would have
been taxed as ordinary income (under IRC
§124S) if property had been sold. IRC
§170(e)(1)(A).
Depreciable real property - Contribution
deduction reduced by what would have been
taxed as ordinary income (under IRC §1250)
if property had been sold. IRC §170(e)(1)(A).
Life Insurance- Donor names charity ben eficiary and irrevocably assigns incidents of
ownership to it.
Gift of policy on which premiums remain
to be paid. Income tax deduction is slightly
above cash surrender value. Reg. §25.25126(a). Continued payment of premiums gives
donor deduction for annual premiums. Awrcy, 2S TC 643.
Gift of fully paid-up policy. lncome tax deduction is generally replacement cost. Reg.
§2S.2S12-6(a).
Endowment policy. Charitable deduction
for value minus amount which would be
taxed as ordinary income on a sale. IR C
§170(e)(1)(A). But see Reg. §l.l70A-4(a).

Caveat: Donor has ordinary income of difference between cost and maturity value in year
charity recei ves proceeds. Rev. Rul. 69-102.
1969-1 CB 32; Friedman, 41 TC 428.

Charitable Remainder Trusts

Charitable remainder unitrust -Specifies
that income beneficiary is to receive annual
payments determined by multiplying a fixed
percent (which cannot be less than 5%) by
the net fair market value of the trust assets,
as d etem1ined each year. On death of beneficiary (or survivor beneficiary, if more
than one) charity gets the remainder. IRC
§664(dl(2).
A variation calls for trustee to pay only
trust income if actual income is less than
stated percent. Deficiencies in distributions
(i.e., where trust income is less than stated
percent) are made up in later years if trust
income exceeds the stated percent. Another
variation provides that deficiencies are not to
be made up. IRC §664(d)(3); Reg. §1.6643(a)(1)(i)(b).
Charitable remainder annuity trust Specifics a fixed dollar an10unt (at least 5%
of initial net fair market value of transferred
property) which is to be paid annually to income beneficiary for life. On death of beneficiary (or survivor beneficiary, if more
than one) chari ty gets the remainder. IRC
§664(d)(1).
Payments taxed to recipient - for uni trusts and annuity trusts amounts paid to the
recipient retain the character they had in
trust. Each payment is treated as follows:
First, as ordinary incom e to the extent of the
trust ordinary income for the year and undistributed ordinary income for prior years; Second, as capital gain to the extent of the trust
capital gains for the year and undistributed
capital gains for prior years; Third, as other
income (e.g., tax-exempt income) to the extent of the trust's other income for the year
and undistributed other income for prior
years; Fourth, as a tax free distribution of
principal. IRC §664(b); Reg. §I. 664-1(d).
Unitrusts and annuity trusts are exempt
from taxation -But a trust is not exempt in
any year it has income which would be taxable unrelated business income if trust were
an exempt organization. IRC §664(c). Payments to income beneficiary taxed as described above.
Governing instrument requirements - To
assure charitable deductions and avoid adverse tax consequences, governing instrum ent must contain specific provisions. See:
Reg. §1.664-1 through §1.664-3; IRC §508(e);
IRC §4947(al(2); Rev. Rul. 72-395, 1972-2 CB
340.
Income tax. Contribution deduction allowed for value of remainder interest compute using Treasury tables. Unitrusts IRC §170(f)(2); Reg. §1.664-(3)(c) and §1.664-4;
IRS Pub. 723B. Annuity trusts - IRC
§170(f)(2); Reg. §1.664-2(c); Reg. §20.2031-lO;
IRS Pub. 723A.
Capital gain - No capital gain incurred on
t ransfer of appreciated assets to trust. Rev.
Rul. 55-275, 1955-1 CB 295; Rev. Rul. 60-370,
1960-2 CB 203. Nor is there capital gain to
donor on a sale by trust (except as taxable
under four tier system, above). Exception :
Gain taxable to donor if trust assets sold and
invested in tax-exempt securities pursuant to
express or implied agreement between donor
and trustees. Rev. Rut. 60-370, 1960-2 CB
203.

Estate tax [IRC §205S(c)(2)(A)]. One life
(donor is beneficiary). Fair market value of
trust principal at death included in gross estate and then deductible as charitable contribution - resulting in a washout.
Two life (funded with donor's separate
property, donor is first beneficiary and
another is to be survivor beneficiary). Fair
market value of trust principal at donor's
death included in gross estate but then fully
deductible as charitable contribution if second beneficiary not surv iving. If second
beneficiary survives, charitable remainder
based on survivor's age at donor 's death is
deductible as charitable contribution.
Marital deduction - Potential increased
by 50% of amou nt of trust principal included
in gross estate under present law.
Estate tax niles for charitable remainder
trusts not meeting unitrust or annuity trust
requirements - P.L. 91 -172, §201(b). Estate
tax charitable deduction will be allowed for
the classic charitable remainder trust (the
type created before unitrusts and annuity
trusts were authorized by law):
I. If irrevocable inter vivos trust was created
before October lO, 1969.
2. If charitable remainder trust was created
by Will executed before October 10, 1969
and testator died before October 9, 1972
without having modified Will.
Caveat: Wi ll s of living donors containing
charitable remainder trus ts should be reviewed now.
3. If Will containing charitable remainder
trust drawn before October lO, 1969 and
cannot be modified thereafter because of
individual's mental disability.
See also Rev. Proc. 74-6, 1974-1 CB 417, for
agreement by executor not to exercise broad
administrative and investment powers to
detriment of charitable remainderman.
Nonqualified charitable remainder trusts
created inter vivos or in wills after July 31,
1969 and before December 31, 1977 will qualify for estate tax charitable deduction if refomled or amended to meet unitrust, annuity
trust or pooled income fund trust requirements by December 31, 1977 (or if judicial
proceeding begun by December 31, 1977,
tmst is amended to conform to new requirement within 30 days after final court
determination). lRC §2055(e)(3).
Gift tax [lRC §2522(c)(2)(A)l - Value of the
charitable remainder is fully deductib le and
thus charitable gift is immune from gift tax.
Where there is a life interest other than
donor's, there is a gift by donor to noncharity beneficiary of value of beneficiary's
life interest. Value of that gift depends on
type of property ownership and when other
beneficiary's payments are to begin. It is
often possible to draw trust instrument so
that a gift is not deemed made to non-charity
beneficiary by reserving right by will only to
revoke life beneficiary's interest. Reg.
§1.664-3(a)(4). Rev. Rul. 74-149, 1974-1 CB
157.
C haritable Gift Annuities -Donor transfers
money or property to charity in exchange for
its promise to pay fixed amount annually to
donor (and ;1 survivor, if desired) for life.

Transfer is part !,rift and part purchase of an
annuity.
Income tax- Charitable deduction for excess of amount transferred over what it
would cost to purchase comparable annuity
from commercial insurance company, as determined by Treasury tables. Rev. Rul. 72438, 1972-2 CB 38.

How beneficiary taxed- Annuitant's return
is part capital and part interest; only interest
portion taxable.
Determining amount received tax-freethe exclusion ratio.
investment in contract
[determined under
Rev. Rul. 72-438 (supralJ
expected return
fdetermined using tables in Reg. § 1. 72-9J
Capital gains implications when appreciated
property used to fund gift annuity- there is
capital gain when gift annuity is funded with
appreciated property. An10unt of gain is
smaller, however, than gain would be on sale
of appreciated property - instead of transfer
for charitable gift annuity. Furthermore, gain
is not all reportable in year of transfer for gift
annuity - as it would be on a sale of property. Gain is reported ratably over annuitant's life expectancy when annuity is nonassignable and donor is sole annuitant or
one of th e annuitants in a two-life annuity.
Reg. §l.l01 1-2(a)(4); l.l0ll -2(c) Example 8.

Estate tax - One life (donor is annuitant).
None. IRC §2039. 1\vo lives (hmded with
donor's separate property; donor is first annuitant and second individual is to be survivor annuitant). Jf second annuitant not living on donor 's death, no amount included in
donor's gross estate. Jf second annuitant survives, included in donor 's gross estate is
value of annuity paying same amount to survivor annuitant (at survivor's age at donor's
death ) as donor received during life. IRC
§2039(b).
Any estate tax paid by donor's estate attributable to annuity deductible by survivor
over his life expectancy. Reg. §1.69l(d)-1.
Martial deduction. Annuity qualifies to extent included in gross estate (only if created
inter vivos, not by Will). Reg. §20.2056(b)(l)(g).
Federal gift tax l1RC §2522(c)(2)(A)l - One
life (donor is aJmuitant). No gift tax. Two life
(funded with donor 's separate property, donor
is first annuitant and another is to be survivor annuitant). Gift to survivor of future
and terminable interest; hence no annual
exclusion or marital deduction. Suggestion Gift tax implications for survivor's interest
can be avoided by donor reserving right to
revoke survivor 's annuity by his Will. Reg.
§25.2511-2(c).
Deferred Payment Annuity - (payments
begin more than one year after gift). Income
tax charitable deduction. Rev. Rul. 72-438,
1972-2 CB 38. Exclusion ratio to be determined only at time payments begin; estate
and gift tax implications same as above for
"immediate" annuities (payments begin
within one year of gift.)

Who are the Advocates?
Alumni, faculty, friends, parents,
corporations and foundations donate annually to The Advocates!
The Advocates, established in
1961, is th e Law School 's annual
support group. It was originally devoted solely to providing scholarships for students in n eed of financial assistance. In later years,
however, The Advocates expanded
the use of funds raised to include
such n ecessary items as assisting
with the development of a comprehensive legal curriculum, attracting and retaining outstanding
faculty, acquiring needed books and
equipmen t for the Law Library, and
providing academic research assistance.

Why the Advocates?
Loyola Law Sch ool is a private law
school and therefore requires the financial su pport of concerned benefactors if it is to maintain its position as a leader in legal education.
We must look to alumni and friends
for support. For 1977-78, the Law
School 's operating and salary budget
is $4.2 million. Tuition, which provides the major portion (8 7%) of the
Law School's income, will never
provide 100 percent of the budget's
income unless increased to a prohibitive level. Therefore, the difference mus t be made up from other
income sources, including annual
gifts.
To illustrate the in1portance of
gifts through The Advocates, if 50
percent of the Law School's 4,200
alunmi each contributed $50, that
would total $105,000, almost four
times the amount our alunmi donated last year. Secondly, the percentage of participation is important. Other potential donors like
foundations and corporations have
progran1s to support high er educa-

tion, but they want to know that
the principal beneficiaries of the
Law School's efforts - its alumni
- support their professional school.
If 50 percent of the alumni feel
compelled to make a gift through
The Advocates, the chances are
other non-alumni will respond in
kind and gen erally contribute at the
level requested. This type of support is vital to Loyola Law School's
future well-being.

What Benefits
Accrue to Me?
• The personal satisfaction of helping to provide a quality legal education for today's studen ts.
• Contributin g to the already fine
and growing reputation for excellence in legal education that
Loyola Law School represents .
. Knowledge that my gift will help
to mal<e it possible for the Law
School t o receive additional contributions.
. An investmen t which will continue to pay you professional dividends in the future.
• Your gift is tax deductible.

In recognition of your annual gift,
you will receive an Advocates
m embership card which also identifies the level of financial support,
i.e., Donovan Fellow ($ 1,000), Dibble Fellow ($500-$999), Cook Fellow ($250-$499), and Advocat e Fellow ($100-$249).
We look to you! If you have not
yet contributed this year, we have
provided an attached envelope for
your convenience. Please consider
using it to support your alma mater.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -----

Berman Lecture

300 Year Old Lawbook

Professor Harold J. Berman of Harvard
Law School presented a lecture on
February 16 at Loyola Law School on
the topic of "Human Rights in the
Soviety Union: Some Current An1erican
Fallacies.', Some 100 persons attended
the informative discussion which was
sponsored by the school as part of a guest
lecture program. Berman is a noted
scholar and authority on International
Law and the Soviet Union. He earned
his LL.B. from Yale in 1947, graduated
from the London School of Economics
and Political Science, served on the
executive committee of the Russian
Research Center since 1952, has been a
visiting scholar at the Institute for State
and Law in Moscow, a Rockefeller
Fellow for the study of East-West Trade,
a Ford Fellow for the study of Soviet
Law, and is currently an Ames Professor
at Harvard Law School.

Law for the Ages - This 300-year-old
law book was recently donated to
Loyola Law School by Mrs. Richard M.
Gleason of Los Angeles [left). Looking
over the rare book are Dean Frederick f.
Lower, Jr. and Law Librarian Frederica
M. Sedgewick. The book is titled
"Officina Breviun1," sub-titled "Select
and Approved Forms of Judicial Writs,
and other Process with their Retorns
and Entries in the Court of Common
Pleas at Westminster. As Also Special
Pleadings to Writs of Scire Facias." The
book was printed in 1679 in London and
contains 438 pages of Latin text; the
original tan calf covers have been
detached, but overall condition is very
good. Mrs. Gleason is an interested
friend of Loyola Law School who wished
to donate this family heirloon1 because,
she said, "Sharing is what life is all
about." The early history of this book,

how it crossed the Atlantic from
England, and its possible contributions
to American jurisprudence are
unknown. However, Mrs. Gleason's
grandfather, David R. Woods, inherited
the book in 1880 and brought his
treasured library from New Brighton,
Pennsylvania, to California at the turn
of the century. The book will be placed
on display in the Loyola Law School
library.

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
Unbound Back Volume Prices

Volume Issues
5
6

7
8

9
10
11

1-3
1-3
1-3
1-3

1-4
1-4
1-4

Price Per
Issue
Volume
$3.00
3.00
3.00
3.50
4.00
4.00
4.00

$8.00
8.00
9.00
10.00
13.00
14.00
14.00

D Please send volume - and/or issue--·
D I wish to subscribe to the Loyola of
Los Angeles Law Review.
Price $14.00.

Please enclose remittance with
your order payable to Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review and mail it to:
Business Editor
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
1440 W. Ninth Street
Los Angeles, CA 90015
Name

Jackpot - Professor Steven Hirschtick
served as one of the Blackjack dealers at
the annual "Casino Night" sponsored
by the Loyola Law Students Partners
Association held January 14 at the
University's Westchester campus. All
proceeds from the event, which features

modified Las Vegas style gambling and
entertainment, go to a scholarship fund
for a married law student.

Address
City
State _ _ _ _ _ _ Zip

Casino Night

--~

11

---

Alumni Directory
Loyola Law School is currently planning the publication of a Law
Alumni Directory. This will be the first time such a directory has been
compiled, and the Alumni Relations Office is seeking preliminary
information for its files. To insure that we have your correct address
and professional information, please fill out the sheet below and return
it to us as soon as possible in the enclosed business reply envelope.
Since the value of any Alumni Directory is the publication of correct
and updated information, your cooperation and prompt response will be
greatly appreciated.

r-------------------,

I

I

I
I
I

I
I

I
I
I

Loyola Law School Alumni Directory Questionnaire
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Last Name

First Name

Middle Initial

Professional Occupation/Current Business Title

Class Year

Specialization

I

I
I
I
I

I

Firm Name

Business Address

City

State

Zip

Telephone

Residence Address

City

State

Zip

Telephone

I prefer receiving alumni mail at n1y 0 Business 0 Residence

I

I
I
I

L-------------------J

Board of
Governors Committees
The Loyola Law School Alumni
Association Board of Governors has
formed eight standing con1mittees and
one ad hoc comn1ittee pursuant to their
responsibilities as outlined in the
By~Laws adopted on September 15,
1977, according to President Laurence
G. Preble '68.
The 19-nlenlber Board has organized
the following conm1ittees: Alun1ni
Chapters, Career Planning and
Placement, Special Events, Awards,
Class Correspondent, Law Review,
Advocates, and Class Reunion. The ad
hoc Nominating Con1mittee was also
recently forn1ed.
Comn1ittees which are now active
include the Alumni Chapters
Committee, chaired by Vincent W.
Thorpe '59, which is responsible for
assisting the Law School Development
Office in establishing and supporting
the 18 Alunmi Chapters in California
and assuring that each remains active
and effective; the Career Planning and
Placen1ent Committee, headed by Alvin
N. Loskan1p '68, assists the Placement
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Director in helping students and alumni
identify and achieve career
opportunities and goals. This
committee is also responsible for
conducting a Career Planning Seminar
held each Fall at the Law School.
The Special Events Comn1ittee
coordinates the annual reception for
those graduates who pass the California
Bar Exan1ination, an alumni luncheon
at the State Bar Convention, a reception
for third and fourth-year students, and
the Annual AlumnifAdvocates Dinner
Dance. This committee is chaired by
David M. Finkle '67. The Awards
Committee is responsible for selecting
individuals to receive the Alumni
Association Award at commencement,
honorees at the Annual Alun1ni Dinnet;
and other citations given by the Alumni
Association. Sheldon I. Lodn1er '70 is
chairn1an of this committee.
The following committees are in
various stages of formation at this tin1e.
The Clas~ Correspondent Committee
assists the Developn1ent Office in
gathering alumni news for publication
in the Loyola Lawyer. The Law Review
Comn1ittee is responsible for assisting
and supporting the Loyola of Los

Angeles Law Review. The Advocates
Committee has the responsibility for
insuring the adequate financial support
for the Law School, and the Class
Reunion Committee assists the
Developn1ent Office in planning annual
reunions for the 10, 20, 25, 35 and
50-year classes.
The Nominating Conm1ittee reviews
and recomn1ends candidates for
non1ination to the Board of Governors,
fills any Board vacancies, and is
responsible for organizing and
conducting the election process.
All active members of the Alumni
Association are eligible to serve on
Board Committees.
For further information about the
Board of Governors of the Loyola Law
School Alunmi Association, contact
Pamela Gleason, Alun1ni Relations
Office at (213) 642-3549.

Board of
Governors Elections
Elections for positions on the 1978-79
Board of Governors of the Loyola Law
School Alumni Association are slated
for June. If you are interested in being
nominated for election to the Board, it
is necessary to submit a nominating
petition stating your intent and signed
by at least 20 n1embers of the Alumni
Association. Nominations will be
accepted through the June 1, 1978
deadline by mailing them to Mr.
Laurence G. Preble, c/o Loyola Law
School, Alumni Relations Office, 1440
West Ninth Street, Los Angeles,
California 90015.
There will be five open positions on
the Board to be filled for a two-year
term of office beginning on July l, 1978,
as provided in the By-Laws. All
men1bers of the Alun1ni Association are
eligible for nomination.
General alumni election ballots will
be mailed on June 15. Please return
them imn1ediately since final
tabulations will be held on June 30.
Official results will be announced in the
September issue of Loyola LawyeL
Serving on the Board of Governors
Nominating Con1mittee are chairn1an
Lawrence W. Crispo '61, Thomas E.
Garcin '52, Sheldon I. Lodmer '70, Alvin
N. Loskamp '68, Laurence G. Preble '68,
and Vincent W Thorpe '59.
For further information on the
elections, contact Pamela Gleason,
Alumni Relations office at (213)
642-3549.

Board of
Visitors Hold
First Meeting

In January, the Visitors n1et at the Law
School for a half-day orientation session

and first meeting of the full Board.
The orientation progran1 included a
tour of the campus, and a series of
presentations by members of the faculty
and administration to better acquaint

the Board of Visitors with Loyola.
Preliminary plans to in1prove the Law
School's facilities and continue its
position as a leader in legal education
were also unveiled.
Following the afternoon progran1, the
Visitors met at Times Mirror Square for

cocktails and dinner. Joining Board
members at Times Mirror were Bernard

Joseph A. Ball, partner in the Los
Angeles law firn1 of Ball, Hunt, Hart1
Brown & Baerwitz, earned his law
degree at the University of Southern
California after completing his
undergraduate studies at Creighton
University (Omaha).
Ball is a past president of the State Bar
of California and the Long Beach- Bar
Association. He is a n1ember and past
president of the American College of
Trial Lawyers and the International
Academy of Trial Lawyers. Ball was
counsel to the Comn1ission to
Investigate the Assassination of
President Kennedy.
William H. Doheny1 Jt. '75 received his
bachelor Is degree from Stanford
University. In 1976 Doheny joined the
investment firm of Scudder, Stevens &
Clark (New York) and is an investment
counselor for the company's Los
Angeles office.
M. Louise Eason is a senior vice
president, director, and a member of the
executive con1mittee of California
Federal Savings and Loan Association
(Los Angeles).
Mrs. Eason is on the advisory board of
the executive women S division of the
National Savings and Loan League. She
is one of the founders of Los Angeles
Beautiful and remains active in this
organization.
1

Board Meeting - The first general meeting
and orientation of the Loyola Law School
Board of Visitors included a tour of the
campus, presentations by staff, and
organizational discussions.

J.

Bannan, chairman of the University's
Board of Trustees, Rev. Donald P.
Merrifield, S.J., president of Loyola
Marymount University, Rev. Charles S.
Casassa, S.J., University chancellor, and
Charles R. Redmond '7 4, assistant to
the president, Times Mirror
Corporation.
Since the last issue of Loyola Lawyer,
several individuals have joined the
Board of Visitors. They include:

Milton Feinerman '56 is president and
chief executive officer of Westdale
Savings and Loan Association (Los
Angeles). He received his bachelor's
degree from the University of
California, Los Angeles.
Feinerman is a director and member
of the executive committee of the
California Savings and Loan League, and
a member of the legislative con1mittee
of the U.S. Savings and Loan League.

John E. Anderson '50, a partner in the
Los Angeles and Santa Ana law firn1 of
Kindel & Anderson. He received his
bachelor 1 s degree from the University of
California, Los Angeles 1 and a master's
in business administration degree fron1
Harvard Business School.
Anderson serves on several corporate
and civic boards1 including Claremont
Men's College (vice chairman), Saint
John 1 s Hospital and Health Center
Foundation (president), and the Young
Men's Christian Association (YMCA)
Metropolitan Los Angeles.

Thomas V. Girardi 1 64 is a partner in the
law firm of Girardi, Keese & Crane (Los
Angeles). He earned his bachelor's
degree from Loyola University (Los
Angeles) and a master 1 s degree from
New York University Law School.
Girardi is a member of the part-tin1e
faculty at Loyola Law School and a
lecturer for the Continuing Education of
the Bar in the area of trial procedure and
evidence.
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William T. Huston is a graduate of the
University of Notre Dame Law SchooL
Following a brief period with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Huston
began the practice of law in 1954. Since
1963, he has been president and chief
executive of Watson Land Company and
Watson Industrial Properties (Los
Angeles).
Huston's civic activities include
n1embership in the Los Angeles Area
and Long Beach chambers of commerce.

Robert W. Prescott '39, a member of the
Board since October 1977, succumbed
to cancer on March 3. He was president
and chief executive officer of Flying
Tiger Line, and chaim1an of Tiger
International (Los Angeles). Prescott
pioneered the air cargo industry in the
United States when he founded Flying
Tigers in 1945 as the first airfreight
carrier.
During World War II, he participated
in five major campaigns while serving
as a flight leader for General Claire Lee

Chennault's American Volunteer Group
in China, popularly known as "The
Flying Tigers."
Prescott was a member of the
Transportation Association of America
board and the Board of Directors of the
Air Transport Association. He was also
active in civic affairs, and served as a
trustee of the City of Hope.
Margaret Ann Shaw is an associate of
the Wallace Jan1ie Resource Group (Los
Angeles), a public relations firm. In

James H. Kindel, Jr. '40 is a partner in
the Los Angeles and Santa Ana law firm
of Kindel & Anderson. He received his
bachelor's degree from the University of
California, Los Angeles.
Kindel is a former partner (retired)
with the accounting firm of Coopers &
Lybrand (New York) and he is currently
general counsel for The UCLA
Foundation.
Mariana R. Pfaelzer is a senior partner
in the Century City law firm of Wyman,
Bautzer, Rothman & Kuchel. She earned
her bachelor's degree from the
University of California, Santa Barbara,
and her law degree from the University
of California, Los Angeles.
Mariana's professional, business, and
civic activities include serving as
chairman of the State Bar of California's
Committee on Professional Ethics and
Special Committee on Junveile Justice.
She is a director and a member of the
executive committee of TICOR, and is
president of the Board of Police
Commissioners for Los Angeles.

Milton Feinerman '56
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fohn E. Anderson '50

foseph A. Ball

William H. Doheny, fr '75

M. Louise Eason

Thomas V Girardi '64

William T Huston

1969, Mrs. Shaw was nan1ed a Los
Angeles Times Won1an of the Yea:r:, and
in 1971 received an honorary doctorate
degree from the University of Redlands
where she currently serves as a n1ember
of the Board of Trustees.
Mrs. Shaw's husband, Leslie, is the
former postmaster of Los Angeles
(1963-69), and he is currently vice
president and director of community
affairs for Great Western Financial
Corporation (Beverly Hills).
Sheila Prell Sonenshine '70 is a partner
in the Newport Beach law firm of
Sonenshine & Armstrong. She received
her bachelor's degree from the
University of California, Los Angeles.
Mrs. Sonenshine's professional and
civic activities include being the
founder and chairperson of the Women
and Individual Rights Section of the
Orange County Bar Association, and a
member of the Judiciary and Ethics
committees of the Orange County Bar
Association. In 1976, she was appointed

by Governor Brown to the Board of
Directors for the 32nd District
Agricultural Association.
Martin Stone '51 is chairman of
Monogram Industries (Santa Monica).
He earned his bachelor's degree from
the University of California, Los
Angeles, and a n1aster's degree from the
University of Southern California Law
School. In 1969, Loyola awarded Stone
an honorary Doctor of Laws degree.
Stone's community activities include
serving as president of the Los Angeles
Urban Coalition and as a member of the
National Urban Coalition. He is a
former n1en1ber of the Board of Trustees
of Loyola Marymount University.

fames H. Kindel, [L '40

Mariana R. Pfaelzer

Robert W Prescott '39

Martin Stone '51

Margaret Ann Shaw
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The California Uniform
Determinate Sentencing Act:
The Problem of Vagueness
by Gerald F. Uelmen

Responding to a chorus of criticism that
the unbridled discretion placed in the
hands of parole boards resulted in
unacceptable disparities in the

punishment meted out to similar
offenders for similar crin1es, the
California legislature enacted the
Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act of
1976. By presenting a narrow range of
choices to the sentencing judge, and
creating explicit factual guidelines to
control these choices, subject to
appellate review, the Act promises
greater consistency in sentencing
results.
The California Act confronts a judge
who is sentencing a defendant to prison
with three choices: a middle term, a
lesser term when circumstances of
mitigation are shown, and a greater
term when circumstances of
aggravation are shown. Aggravating and
n1itigating circumstances are described
in Rules adopted by the California
Judicial Council. The judge must
support his choice of the term with a
statement of reasons, and that choice
may be challenged on appeal by the
defendant. To illustrate the effect of
these changes, we can compare a
defendant convicted of armed robbery
before and after the new law. Before the
new law took effect, robbery was
punishable by an indeterminate
sentence of one year to life in prison;
but if the jnry found the defendant was
armed with a dangerous or deadly
weapon, the possible sentence was five
years to life in prison. The defendant
convicted of ordinary robbery would be
eligible for parole after serving one year,
but a defendant convicted of armed
robbery would have to serve one-third of
the five year minimun1 before being
eligible for release on parole. The actual
parole release date and length of the

parole tern1 would be determined by the
Adult Authority based on a subjective
judgement of the defendant's progress
toward rehabilitation. Under the new
law; armed robbery is no longer defined
as a separate crime. Robbery is
punishable by two, three or four years.
Ordinarily, the three year term would be
in1posed, unless aggravating
circumstances are shown, to justify the
four year term, or mitigating
circun1stances are shown, to justify the
two year tern1. Among the aggravating
circumstances which would justify the
four year term would be proof that the
defendant was armed. Alternatively, the
fact that the defendant was armed could
be pleaded and proven as enhancement,
which would also add one year to the
sentence to be served. The defendant
would not be released on parole until he
served two-thirds of the sentence, and
the parole term is ordinarily limited to
one year.
While these reforms n1ay correct the
most serious disparities in sentences,
they inject procedural changes into the
sentencing process which raise
substantial issues of constitutional
magnitude. If the sentencing judge is
required to make new factual findings
to justify the sentence, a whole panoply
of procedural rights within the rubric of
due process n1ay apply, including the
right to standards which are not vague,
adequate notice, confrontation and cross
examination of witnesses, the right to
exclude unlawfully obtained evidence,
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, a jury
trial, explicit findings and appellate
review. The magnitude of the in1pact
such changes could have upon the
crin1inal justice system is rather stark;
while only 10-15 percent of California
defendants now avail themselves of all
of the procedural rights of a trial, all
convicted defendants are ultimately
subject to the sentencing process,
including the 85-90% who plead guilty.
Even if the full panoply of due process
rights is limited to the 28% of felony
defendants who receive prison or jail
sentences, we face the possibility of a
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vast multiplication of the commitment
of judicial resources to what is now a
rather routine and expeditious process.
As the law has evolved thus far;. two
basic models of the sentencing process
have emerged. The traditional model,
which we can label the discretion
model, gives the judge relatively free
access to information for sentencing. In
Williams " New York, 337 U.S. 241,
(1948), upholding the imposition of a
death penalty on the basis of
inforn1ation contained in a presentence
report to the judge, the Court reasoned
that "modem concepts individualizing
punishment have made it all the more
necessary that a sentencing judge not be
denied an opportunity to obtain
pertinent information by a requirement
of rigid adherence to restrictive rules of
evidence properly applicable to the
trial. 11 The Court did not hold that the
sentencing process is immune from due
process scrutiny, however; noting that
the defendant was represented by
counsel, and was not deprived of an
opportunity to present evidence. Only
the rights to reasonable notice of the
charges and an opportunity to examine
adverse witnesses were explicitly
rejected.
The second model1 which we will call
the enhancement model1 finds its
paradigm in Specht v. Patterson, 386
U.S. 605, (1967). There the Court
confronted a proceeding whereby a
defendant convicted of indecent
liberties1 carrying a maximum sentence
of ten years, could be found to be a
utlueat of bodily harm to the public" or
a 11habitual offender 11 and given an
indetern1inate sentence of one day to
life. The finding was made on the basis
of a psychiatric report submitted to the
Court. Noting that the finding
defendant was a public threat or
habitual offender was a new finding of
fact that was not an ingredient of the
offense charged1 the Court found the
situation "radically different 11 from
Williams v. New York. This difference
entirled the defendant to the "full
panoply of the relevant protections
which due process guarantees in state
criminal proceedings1 11 including 11 that

he be present with counsel1 have an
opportunity to be heard1 be confronted
with witnesses against him1 have the
right to cross-examine1 and to offer
evidence of his own. And there must
be findings adequate to make
meaningful any appeal that is allowed."
The absence of a right to proof beyond a
reasonable doubt and a jury trial from
this catalogue of rights may simply be
explained by noting that the cases
holding these rights to be incorporated
within "due process 11 had not yet been
decided.
The essential difference between the
discretion model and the enhancement
model is the existence of an explicit
factual predicate for punishment which
was not an essential dement of the
underlying crime. But these two models
are not mutually exclusivei it would be
more accurate to characterize them as
representing opposite ends of a
spectrum. Due process is no longer the
"all or none' proposition suggested in
Specht v: Patterson. As stated by the
Court more recently in Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1971):
11
0nce it is determined that due
process applies 1 the question
remains what process is due. It
has been said so often by this
Court and others as not to require
citation of authority that due
process is flexible and calls for
such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands. 11
The purpose of this paper will be to
review the major procedural protections
encompassed within due process1 and
consider their applicability to the
sentencing aggravation procedures
envisioned in the California statute. We
will find that these procedures do not
always fit comfortably into either the
discretion or the enhancement models.
But in seeking the answer to 11What
process is due1 11 the ambiguous terrain
we tread is not untrod. At least two
other legislative devices raise a similar
galaxy of issues.
First1 we have the death penalty
statutes enacted in response to the
holding in Furman v: Georgia that a
discretionary death penalty violates the
Eighth Amendment proscription of
11
cruel and unusual punishment. 11 These
statutes require the finding of specified
11
aggravating circumstances 11 to justify
the imposition of a penalty of death.
This separate factual finding may take
these provisions outside the realm of

Williams " New York. Yet the
enhancement model of Specht v.
Patterson might be distinguished1 since
the aggravating circumstances
frequently bear a close relationship to
the underlying crime. Nonetheless 1 each
of the death penalty statutes
subsequently upheld by the Supreme
Court provided an explicit list of
aggravating circumstances 1 an
opportunity to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses, proof
beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury1 and
explicit factual findings which were
subject to appellate review. The statutes
of Georgia and Texas also provided a
defendant with advance notice of which
aggravating circumstances were being
relied upon. In the one state where the
judge was vested with discretion to
disregard the jury 1s recommendation
and impose a death penalty1 the court1
in Gardner" Florida 97 S. Ct. 1197,
(1977), held that a presentence
investigation report relied upon by the
sentencing judge in such circumstances
must be disclosed in its entirety to
defense counsel1 thus limiting its prior
holding in Williams " New York to
non-capital cases.
Similarly, the California death penalty
law recently enacted over the
governor 1S veto provides for a full
panoply of due process protections. A
death penalty may not be imposed
unless the jury finds that enumerated
"special circumstances 11 were present,
and considers other evidence presented
in aggravation. Not only must the
special circumstances be alleged and
specifically found to be true beyond a
reasonable doubt1 but no additional
evidence in aggravation can be
presented unless notice of the evidence
to be introduced was given to the
defendant before trial. The special
circumstances must be proven by
competent evidence1 subject to the
same opportunity to confront and
cross-examine which applies to the
trial.
A second parallel is the federal
Dangerous Special Offender sentencing
provisions presented in the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970 and the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act of 1970. Both provide a
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defendant convicted with a n1aximum
of twenty-five years, upon a finding he
is a 1'dangerous special offender." The
statute specifically provides that a
notice of the prosecutor's intent to rely
upon the Dangerous Special Offender
provisions must be filled prior to trial,
and that the defendant has a right to
counsel, con1pulsory process,
cross-examination, specific factual
findings and appellate review of the
determination a defendant is a
Dangerous Special Offender. The statute
does, however, permit reliance upon
hearsay in presentence reports, limited
non-disclosure of such reports, and
provides that the burden of proof is
n1erely a preponderance of the evidence,
to be determined by a judge sitting
without a jury. This middle position
was justified by the draftsmen as
follows:
"The requirements of Specht v.
Patterson * * * are inapplicable,
since no separate charge triggered
by an independent offenSe is at
issue. Only circumstances of
aggravation of the offense for which
the conviction was obtained are
before the court."
As we review each of the procedtrral
rights in the due process panoply, it will
be enlightening to compare the judicial
treatment of these two legislative
parallels.
The task of defining circumstances of
aggravation and n1itigation under the
California law was delegated by the
legislature to the California Judicial
Council, a body con1prised of
representatives of all California courts.
The task of drafting reasonably detailed
and explicit standards is a formidable
one, perhaps best done by an
adn1inistrative body. Whether that
adn1inistrative body should be a judicial
one, however, raises an intriguing
question of separation of powers, since
the constitutionality of the standards
adopted will ultimately be resolved by
the Courts.
The constitutional issues raised by
the forn1ulation of these standards are
serious ones. The right to explicit
definitions which are not vague is an
essential of due process of law. Two
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rationales support this doctrine of
vagueness: the lack of fair notice of
potential defendants, and the danger of
discriminatory application where the
law is vague. While both rationales
apply with greatest force to the
definition of the crin1e itself, one cannot
sin1ply dismiss the vagueness doctrine
as inapplicable to sentencing
enhancement provisions. This n1uch is
now abundantly clear from the Supreme
Court opinions considering the
constitutionality of statutes defining
the aggravating circun1stances under
which the death penalty may be
imposed. The precision with which
those circumstances were defined was
of a central concern to the Court. In
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, (1976),
for example, the Court carefully
examined each of ten categories of
aggravating circumstances in the
Georgia statute in terms of vagueness or
overbreadth. The Court noted with
approval that the Georgia Supreme
Court, in Arnold v. State, 224 S.E.2d 386
(1976), had already declared one
statutory ground for capital punishment
was unconstitutionally vague, and had
narrowly construed other grounds.
The Arnold opinion is instructive for
our purposes. The Georgia Supren1e
Court was confronted with a defendant
sentenced to death upon the jury's
finding of one aggravated circumstance:
The offense * * * was con1mited by a
person * * * who has a substantial
history of serious assaultive criminal
convictions." Citing Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104(1972), the court
noted that 11 Whenever a statute leaves
too much roon1 for personal whim and
subjective decision-making without a
readily ascertainable standard of
minimal objective guidelines for its
application it cannot withstand
constitutional scrutiny." Applying this
standard, the court found the term
"substantial history" unconstitutionally
vague.
The conclusion that the vagueness
doctrine applies to sentence
enhancement provisions does not, of
course, n1ean that it applies with the
same force as the doctrine is applied to
definition of crime. The doctrine has
always been applied with varying
strictness, depending upon the context.
The strictest application has always
been reserved for cases where first
an1endment liberties were at stake.
11

Similarly, a higher standard of strictness
is recognized where the statute defines
the availability of capital punishment.
At the other end of the spectrum are
cases suggesting greater leeway with
respecting to regulatory statutes
governing business activities." This
variable standard is consistent with the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the
standards of procedural due process.
Thus, the first step in applying the
constitutional test of vagueness to
definitions of aggravating circumstances
is to ascertain the extent of aggravation
permitted. The extent of aggravation
should not, however, be measured in
purely quantitative terms: the real issue
is one of proportion. For example, the
aggravation of a two-year sentence to a
three-year sentence under the California
law pern1its a 50% increase in the
punishment being meted outi at the
other end of the spectrum, adding one
year to a six-year sentence is an increase
of less than 17%. The subtlety of this
distinction was not lost on the
draftsn1en of the Dangerous Special
Offender provision in the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970. The
increased sentence permitted upon a
finding that the defendant is a
dangerous special offender is limited to
a term 11 not disproportionate in severity
to the maxin1um term otherwise
authorized by law." Apparently, this
lin1itation was intended as an end-run
around Specht v. Patterson, which held
that the full panoply of the relevant
protection which due process
guarantees in state criminal procedures
applied at the sentencing of a habitual
offender under the Colorado Sex
Offenders Act. The proportionality
limitation was designed to insure that
the increased sentence did not represent
a penalty for a different crime. At least
one court was persuaded by this
11

argument, although it contradicts rather
specific language in Specht:
"The Sex Offenders Act does not
make the commission of a specified
crime the basis for sentencing. It
makes one conviction the basis for
commencing another proceeding
under another act to determine
whether a person constitutes a
threat of bodily harm to the public,
or is an habitual offender and
mentally ill. This is a new finding
of fact that was not an ingredient of
the offense charged. 11 id at 608.
A persuasive argument can be made
that, even if Specht is limited to a
separate offense, whether the
aggravating circumstance states a
separate offense should be determined
by a comparison of the nature of the
aggravating circumstance and the
nature of the offense, rather than
looking to the extent of aggravation
permitted. Using this standard, it is
clear that many of the aggravating
circumstances specified in Rule 421
adopted by the California Judicial
Council do state a separate offense, at
least to the same extent the Colorado
Sex Offender Act did. A sentence can be
aggravated if the defendant "has engaged
in a pattern of violent conduct," if he
has 11numerous" prior convictions, or if
he threatened witnesses or suborned
perjury.
The test of proportionality remains a
more significant part of the equation,
however. Whether the aggravating
circumstance is characterized as a
separate offense or not can quickly
engage us in a label game. The real
focus of our inquiry should be what's at
stake for the defendant. Applying this
test, we can see that the California
approach of broadly defining aggravating
circumstances across the board, to be
applied to all crimes and all sentencing
ranges, may create difficulties.
Although the definitions may be precise
enough in one context, they n1ay not in
anotheL
The second step in our vagueness
analysis should be to ascertain the
extent of free play in the definition of
aggravating circumstances, to insure
that prosecutors and judges are held to
ascertainable standards in utilizing
them. When we confront an aggravating
circumstance which is so broad and
amorphous it could be plausibly utilized
against any defendant, we face the very
danger that the vagueness doctrine is
designed to prevent: the prosecutor can

pick and choose the defendants against
whom the provision will be utilized
virtually at whim.
Applying this standard to the
aggravating circumstances contained in
Rule 421 promulgated by the California
Judicial Council, we see some rather
startling examples of vagueness:
Under Rule 421 (a) (3 ), circumstances
in aggravation include that "the victim
was particularly vulnerable." Every
victim, of course, is "vulnerable." What
m.akes a victim "particularly"
vulnerable is left to our imagination:
age? sex? physical incapacity? stupidity?
time of day or night? A prosecutor
would need little imagination to utilize
this circumstance in virtually every
crime that has a victim.
Rule 421 (a) (8) includes that the
"planning, sophistication or
professionalism with which the crin1e
was carried out, or other facts, indicated
premeditation." This would seem
applicable to all but the most
spontaneous of crimes.
Rule 421 (a)(ll) allows aggravation if
"the crime involved a large quantity of
contraband." Frequent use of this
provision can be anticipated in drug
prosecutions. In defining the crime of
possession with intent to distribute, at
least one court has held a provision
authorizing conviction based solely on
evidence of quantity without specifying
the amount required was void for
vagueness. Whether a quantity is large
should not be left to the varying
subjective judgements of the
prosecutors to whon1 the use of this
provision is entrusted.
While the California Uniform
Determinate Sentencing Act may
achieve greater consistency in
sentencing, this result cannot be
attained at the expense of the
procedural guarantees of due process. It
appears that attempting to define
aggravating circumstances for all
crimes, without particularization, will
inevitably lead to broad and amorphous
definitions subject to a constitutional
challenge as void for vagueness.

Gerald F Uelman received his B.A.
from Loyola University in 1962, earned
a f.D. at Georgetown University,
Washington, D. C. in 1965, and an LL.M.
the following year at Georgetown
where he was named an E. Barrett
Prettyman Fellow; he served as an
Assistant U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles
(Chief of Special Prosecutions Unit}
from 1966-70. He is a Certified
Specialist-Criminal Law, by the
California Board of Legal
Specializations. He joined the faculty at
Loyola Law School in 1970, teaching
classes in Criminal Law, Criminal
Procedure, and Drug Abuse Law. He
served as the Associate Dean at Loyola
in 1973-75, and was instrumental in
writing a successful grant proposal to
the U.S. Dept. of Health, Education and
Welfare which secured the first drug
abuse law program at any U.S. law
school. Uelman was involved in the
founding of the Loyola Continuing
Legal Education Program in 1975, and
has served as chairman of the CLE
committee for three years. He has
written and lectured extensively in the
area of Criminal Law related to drug
abuse, served as a consultant to the
Rand Corporation, and was a Special
Examiner with the California State Bar
Disciplinary Committee from 1975-77.
1
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Faculty Foru01
Frederick J. Lower, Jr. '64 has been selected as
a Fellow of the American Bar Foundation.
Membership is limited to only one-third of
one percent of the lawyer population in each
jurisdiction. The By-laws of the Fellows
provides that selection for membership is in
recognition of outstanding achievement and
professional distinction. Dean Lower also
attended the mid-Winter meeting of the
American Bar Association held in New
Orleans, February 8-11, and met with the
Deans of the American Association of Law
Schools. Lower was also the keynote speaker
at the annual meeting of the Superior Court
Clerks Association in Los Angeles, and was
appointed to the recently formed executive
committee of the Committee on Legal
Education of the California State Bar.

J. Timothy Philipps has been appointed
chairman of the ABA's Section of Taxation
Task Force 01_1 the Model State Tax Court
Act. He has also recently published an article
on "Deductibility of Legal Expenses in
Corporate Readjustments" appearing in The
Monthly Digest of Tax Articles.

Owen G. Fiore '61 was a faculty member of
the American Law Institute-American Bar
Association Tax Planning for Agriculture
course, a three-day seminar emphasizing tax
and estate planning problems of farmers and
ranchers held in New Orleans. Fiore has
spoken widely on estate planning for
agribusiness, and he appeared as a speaker for
the Montana Tax Institute sponsored by the
University of Montana Law School in
December.
Robert W. Benson submitted a paper at the
request of the World Intellectual Property
Organization in Geneva, Switzerland,
commenting on the WIPO draft treaty for the
protection of geographical indications on
wine bottles and other consumer goods.
Professor Benson also testified in San
Francisco before a panel of the U.S. Treasury
Department on the need for reform in the
matter of deceptive labeling of wines.
Gerald F. Uelman testified in December 1977
during hearings conducted by Los Angeles
County Supervisor Ed Edelman on
procedures to deal with police shooting
incidents. He is currently on a six-month
sabbatical to participate in an
ABA-sponsored Legal Exchange Program

Donovan Dinner -Dean Frederick J. Lower, Jr. '64 (left) and James N. Kenealy, Jr. '52 exchange comments on the occasion of the Donovan Fellows Dinner held October 25, 1977 at
the University's Westchester campus. The Donovan Fellows, named in honor of the late Rev.
Joseph J. Donovan, S.J., is a major support group of the Law School. Mr. Kenealy and several
other alumni have recently formed a Steering Committee which is actively working to increase membership in the Donovan Fellows.

with Scotland Yard to study British drug
abuse criminal procedures. He also appeared
on the Criminal Justice panel of the first
West Coast Conference of Constitutional
Law. Professor Uelman presented a paper on
"Constitutional Issues in the Federal
Sentencing Reform Proposal" now under
deliberation before the U.S. Senate.

David C. Tunick spoke on the topic of "Civil
Procedure" at the annual meeting of the
Superior Court Clerk's Association held in
Los Angeles. Professor Tunick also addressed
the recently formed Committee on Law and
Technology of the Los Angeles County Bar
Association on the topic of "Computers and
the Law."
Jane Wolf Eldridge and Gerald F. Uelman
appeared before the California Court of
Appeals in San Bernardino last November to
argue on behalf of the California Conference
on Methadone Progran1s in the case of Reyes
v. Superior Court, challenging the use of
child abuse laws to prosecute a pregnant
mother who is an addict.
Louise Bereswill, director of Admissions,
traveled to Hawaii to participate in a panel
presentation with a consortium of private
west coast law schools in a joint recruitment
effort.
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Donald T. Wilson is serving as faculty advisor
to the upcoming Loyola Law School
publication International and Comparative
Law Annual. This is the first such
publication in Southern California and only
the 19th in the United States. It is scheduled
for completion in June 1978.

Steven Hirschtick spoke on the topic of
"Forming Professional Corporations" before
the National Financial Management Seminar
of the American College of Radiology in Las
Vegas, February 17, 1978.
Gideon Kanner was a guest speaker at the
California Trial Lawyers seminar at the
recent Bar Convention.
Lola McAlpin-Grant '66 addressed a
consumer conference at the Student Trial
Lawyer's Association in October 1977, spoke
to a group of Atlantic-Richfield employees in
November and delivered a speech to a career
conference sponsored by the Girls State
Program. Mrs. McAlpin-Grant also gave the
keynote address to a Goodwill Industries
meeting last December in Los Angeles on the
topic of securing civil rights and justice for
handicapped Americans.

Missing Persons
The Alumni Office records indicate that
there is no current address for the alumni
listed below. If you know the whereabouts of
anyone on this list of "lost alunmi," please
call the Alumni Office: telephone (213)
642-3549 or drop us a note;
Alunmi Office
Loyola Law School
1440 West Ninth Street
Los Angeles, California 90015

The list will be continued in forthcoming
issues of the Loyola Lawyer.
Francis J. Bird
Frank J. McCarthy
Harold V. Daley
Charles E. Derochie
Carroll T. Donovan
Maurice A. Gallician
John J. Gorman
Francis J. McDevitt
James T. Montgomery
Theodore W. Nosek
Walter E. Rankin
Jose A. Regalado
Laurence J. Stock
Mariano Alcocer
William Connors
John J. Mactigue
Maurice J. O'Brien
Charles T. Schiros
Lorraine L. Sylvaine
Jose M. Villella
Charles 0. Erbaugh
Laurence S. Harris
James D. Power

1926
1926
1927
1927
1927
1927
1927
1927
1927
1927
1927
1927
1927
1928
1928
1928
1928
1928
1928
1928
1930
1930
1930

Walter E. Rasmus
David Rothman
Lewis W. Andrews, Jr.
Francis E. Carter

Helen M. Cassidy
Jerome C. Dolan
Ethel McCarthy
Helen C. Mittelman
Paul D. O'Neil
John Sabate

r.

Joseph B. del Valle
Joseph Doherty
Elmer P. Hardenbergh
Saied N. Karam
George R. Miller
Edward A. O'Connor
Walter E. Sourlock
Fred E. Subith
Reginald F. Walker
Truman B. Gilbert
Malcolm Hart
Paul S. Mahan
James J. McNulty
David J. O'Leary
Frank M. Rau
Carlos A. Riveroll
James L. Woodward
Charles S. Barrett
Herbert C. Cooke
Louis J. Petritz
Donald M. Bane
Joseph E. Donkin
Richard A. Haley
Gordon B. Hislop
Meyer T. Levy
Dennie E. McAughan
Charles W. Peckham

1930
1930
1931
1931
1931
1931
1931
1931
1931
1931
1932
1932
1932
1932
1932
1932
1932
1932
1932
1933
1933
1933
1933
1933
1933
1933
1933
1934
1934
1934
1935
1935
1935
1935
1935
1935
1935

John K. Light
Richard S. Pierce
Han. Paul S. McCormick

Arnold Borenstein
Rudolf Maslach
Robert A. Millikan
A. Donald McAlpine
John W. McElheney
Douglas L. Barnes
John F. Bums
Franklin G. Campbell
John R. Morris
George R. Stene
Frank J. Barry
Ben M. Grimes
Leslie M. Hershman
Robert A. Smith
Edwin Greenberg
Thomas D. Griffith
Kenneth A. Murphy
Arnold Colt
George C. Goldman
William P. James
William D. McGarry
Robert T. Whitman
Verne L. Cline, Jr.
Walter I. Colby
I. F. Fiori
Stanley H. Shaw
Robert G. Helm
James D. Littlejohn
John M. Marshall
Frank X. Ball
Richard E. Stewart
Maripaul Salmon Baier
Bruce Buchanan
Joseph J. Armoush

19-36
1936
1937
1938
1938
1938
1939
1939
1940
1940
1940
1940
1940
1941
1941
1941
1941
1942
1943
1944
1947
1949
1949
1949
1949
1950
1950
1950
1950
1951
1951
1951
1953
1953
1955
1955
1956
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